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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WAR IN THE PENINSULA.—After confident predictions, that the French would be speedily expelled from Spain; after such a description of the decrepid state of the enemy, as might have led one to suppose it impossible that he could longer maintain his ground in that country; after, in short, the people of England, the thinking people of England, the "*most thinking people*," had, through the representations of a hired press, been made to believe the war in Spain as upon the eve of a most glorious and successful conclusion, and had been induced, accordingly, to make bonfires, to illuminate their houses, to give balls and masquerades, and to waste, in expressions of joy, the means of feeding their two millions of paupers for one day, at least, in the year; after all this, we now are informed, that those same Frenchmen, whom we looked upon as nearly annihilated, have risen up in greater force than ever; have driven our army from its advanced positions; have re-entered the capital of Spain in triumph; have greatly harassed our army on its retreat towards Portugal; and, as appears from the official dispatches of Lord Wellington, was continuing its pursuit of parts, at least, of our army when those dispatches came away.—There is nothing in this reverse in Spain to excite any peculiar degree of surprise. Such reverses have frequently happened in war; and, by every wise man they will be expected; because war is, in many respects, a game at chances. There are so many circumstances, wholly unforeseen, which arise in every war, that there is no commander who has not, at some time or other, experienced a reverse. But, in our case, it is the *boasting*; it is the *bragging*; it is the exaggerated statements which our news-papers promulgate, and which the people believe; these are the things that make any reverse in war of great consequence in England. In the present instance, the bragging was carried to such a length; the exultation at our entrance into Madrid; the hyperbolical stuff that was published upon the occasion,

naturally makes the nation hang down its head, when, before the bonfires are well extinguished, they see the enemy, who was described as being reduced to almost nothing, re-entering that city.—These reflections are, however, useless; similar impositions will continue to be practised upon the people; and the people will continue to be the dupes of the hirelings whose business it is to buoy up their spirits by the means of falsehood, ushered forth in bombastical language. The impostors who carry on this trade of deception, are not to be reclaimed, or to be shamed. The detection of them to-day will be no check upon them to-morrow. It is their *business* to deceive the people; to which may be added, that no small part of the people love to be deceived. They are afraid to look their situation in the face; they feel a conviction, that things cannot go on long in the way they are now going. They are afraid to know the truth; they hate the man that tells it them; they say, as did the Israelites of old, "prophesy unto us smooth things, prophesy unto us lies;" and to do their prophets justice, they are by no means backward in complying with their request; for of all the liars that the world ever saw, the Editors of the hired papers in London are certainly the greatest.—Nevertheless, they have, as we shall presently see, certain inconveniences to contend with, arising out of their own falsehoods. In the present instance, they find themselves not a little puzzled to account for the evacuation of Madrid and the retreat of our army. They represented the success of Lord Wellington as being so complete; they represented the French as being so cut up; so reduced in numbers; so fallen in spirit; so destitute of the means of even withstanding the further progress of our army; that they now do really seem to boggle; the falsehood does not seem to be quite ready at the tip of their lips.—As to the real events of the war, it appears, that Lord Wellington had advanced further than his means could well allow. After the battle of Salamanca, he was tempted to push on to Madrid, and then

to attempt the capture of the fortress of Burgos. In this latter attempt he appears to have failed, after sustaining great loss in men, and, which was of full as much importance, after giving the enemy time to gather round him. Hence he has been compelled to retreat, and, from the tenour of his dispatches, it appears probable, that he will be compelled to continue his retreat till he once more reaches his lines in Portugal, or, at least, until he gets back to the point whence he started at the beginning of the campaign.—With regard to the *detail* of his operations, it would be impossible to give so good an account of them as the reader will find in the dispatches which are inserted below. There are, however, two or three facts stated, respecting the conduct of the *German Troops*, which appear to me worthy of particular notice.—It appears, that Lord Wellington, having been informed of the intention of the enemy to advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos, posted a picquet to watch their approaches in a certain quarter; that this picquet was commanded by an Officer of the Brunswick Legion; that this subaltern *disobeyed his orders*, and was *taken* with his picquet; and that in *consequence* of this, the enemy obtained possession of a point of great advantage to them. It is here said positively that the Officer *disobeyed* his orders; and, as he and his picquet were taken prisoners, the reader will form his own opinion as to the motive for such disobedience.—In another part of his dispatches, Lord Wellington says, that he had sent orders to the regiment of Brunswick Oels to take post on the ruins of a bridge, in such manner as to prevent the enemy from repairing it; and that he had the *mortification*, however, of learning, the next night, that this regiment had been obliged to *abandon its post*.—He says no more upon the conduct of this regiment upon this occasion. He does not add the *reason* why they were obliged to abandon it.—Of far greater interest, however, are other views of these military operations. And, first, as connected with *party* politics at home. The intelligent reader must have perceived, that, of late, a junction has been in view between the *whigs* and the little *knot* of Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning. Hence on the part of the former an incessant *crying up* of Lord Wellington, to which they were formerly not at all accustomed. The more immediate partisans of Lord Wellesley cry up Lord Wellington, of course, as they always have done. The

partisans of the Ministers also cry him up, because he is their cock. Hence he has all these parties for *him*; but the two former parties confine their praise to him exclusively; whereas the partisans of the Ministers give, of course, the Ministers a share of the praise arising out of the victories in Spain.—These different views of the parties have given rise to some very curious observations as to the *cause* of the recent disasters. The opponents of the Ministers contend broadly, that it is their fault, and their fault alone, that Madrid is re-occupied by the French, and that our army has been compelled to retreat before an enemy which, but a week ago, he was understood to have driven nearly out of Spain.—It behoves us, who, as real friends of our country, avoid attaching ourselves to either of these interested parties, to form a correct opinion of this matter; to determine, to whom, if to any one or any body of men, the fault of this reverse in Spain belongs.—The Times news-paper, which, for very sufficient reasons, I dare say, is become the indefatigable partisan of Lord Wellesley, ascribes the necessity of the retreat from Madrid wholly to the Ministers. I call it retreat from Madrid. The hired news-papers say that Buonaparté has *run away* from Moscow; but, in speaking of what has recently taken place at Madrid, they, like Master Mathew, call it, “for more grace,” not running away, but *retreating, withdrawing, retrograding, flinging back the army, changing front, taking up a new position*, or the like; in which respect I shall beg to be permitted to follow their example, and shall, in no case, call it *running away*.—The Editor of the TIMES has, then, asserted, the necessity of flinging back our army is to be *wholly ascribed to the Ministers*; than which I do not remember a more bold assertion. The assertion is not, indeed, attempted to be *proved*, except by some vague statements as to a *want of means*, founded upon that passage in the dispatches where the writer says, that “his *means were limited*,” a phrase, by the bye, which does not appear to carry any great signification in it; for, whose means are not limited? Where is the commander; where is the human being; where is the nation, whose means have not *some limits*? This phrase, therefore, contains, and can contain, no complaint against the Ministers, until it be proved, that they were enabled to put *unlimited means* into his hands; and, as such a position cannot be maintained, the charge against the Mi-

Ministers, founded upon this phrase, must fall to the ground.—The same writer talks of “a miserable æconomy.” What does he mean? Does he know of any men, any money, any warlike means that we have to spare? Does he want the war in the Peninsula to cost us more than twenty millions of pounds in a year? This writer says, that if 10,000 men had been sent out instantly upon our Ministers hearing of the victory of Salamanca, great things might have been done. He says, that “the whole mechanism of the French force in Spain would have been broken to pieces, never more to be re-constructed;” and, at this very moment we are told, that the French have a force nearly double in point of numbers to our’s. How, then, were 10,000 men to have produced such wonders? Besides, whence were they to come, and whence the means of transporting them? The Courier of the 24th instant gives us a specimen of the sort of troops now shipping off to fill up the gaps, made in our army by the late battles.* It is impossible to believe, that the Ministers are not driven to take recruits of this sort by the absolute want of native soldiers. In short, it is notorious that the country has been drained, till the Government have been compelled to resort to the inlisting of poor, feeble creatures, such as would, on no account, have been received into the army only a few years ago; and, that, for want of men of any size or description, boys, at even 13 years of age, are anxiously sought after, and with great difficulty obtained, at ten times the bounty, and more than ten times the bounty, that was given to a grenadier of twenty years of age, at the time when I entered into the army. I myself have seen, not long ago, upwards of

* Last week about a thousand men from the *King’s German Legion* marched into this town, in three divisions, from Bexhill, on their route to Portsmouth, there to embark to join Lord Wellington’s army in Spain. Most of them had been *taken prisoners in the French service*, and *volunteered from the different prisons* in which they were confined. They are for the most part *fine looking young men*; and their uniform gives them an appearance very different from that which they exhibited when they passed through this town, a short time since, in their yellow jackets, from the depot at the Isle of Wight, to join their Legion at Bexhill.—*Sussex Paper.*

three hundred men together, not one of whom would have been received into any regiment in the service, previous to the commencement of the anti-jacobin war. It is easy to *talk* about dispatching ten thousand men to Spain at a moment’s warning; but, in the present state of our resources, the execution of such a measure is a matter of some difficulty. If Lord Wellington stood in need of an immediate reinforcement of ten thousand men to enable him to keep his ground at Madrid, it was his fault, and not the fault of the Ministers, that he was compelled to retreat; because, he must have known, that it would be a matter of great difficulty for the Ministers to send him ten thousand men in the course of several months, and that it was physically impossible for them to do it on a sudden. It appears, that, even if he had applied for the men the moment he got possession of Madrid, there was not time to assemble them at the sea-ports in England, to ship them in transports, to land them, and to march them to join him before the time when he was obliged to retreat.—It appears to me, therefore, that, his being obliged to abandon the capital of Spain, and to retreat before the French army, cannot fairly be ascribed to the Ministers, in any degree whatever, unless it should appear, that his advance to Madrid was in consequence of *peremptory commands from home*. If that was the case, then, indeed, it was for the Ministers to know the extent of his means, compared with those of the enemy, and it was for them to provide him amply with every thing necessary for maintaining the ground which they had ordered him to take. That this, however, should have been the case, is altogether improbable; and, indeed, the friends of Lord Wellington ought to be the last to encourage the supposition; for, the affirmative of it would completely strip him of the far greater part of the merit which has been given to his victories; it would strip him of the merit of conception, arrangement, and combination, and leave him merely that of execution.—These opponents of the Ministers, who profess a species of admiration of Lord Wellington approaching to Eastern adoration, in their eagerness to cast blame upon the Ministers, seem to overlook the dilemma, in which they place the object of their worship; for, either he was left to pursue his own plans, or he was not; either his advance forward into Spain was the effect of his own choice, or, it was the effect of orders which he received from home. If

the latter, the merit, or, at least, all the higher part of the merit, of the victory of Salamanca and of the capture of Madrid, belong to the Ministers; if the former, then, he, himself, was the master of his own movements, and ought to have proportioned them, together with all his undertakings, to the extent of the means which he had within his power.—Nothing, in my opinion, can be more foolish, to say nothing of the injustice of it, than to impute the failure at Burgos to the Ministers. They are charged with neglect in not supplying the commander with battering cannon for the carrying on of the siege. Why, before the Ministers did know, or could know, that he had undertaken the siege, it was too late for them to send a *dispatch* to him on the subject; he was obliged to give up the siege before there was time for them to send him a *letter* in answer to any application that he might have made for battering cannon. How, then, was it possible for them to ship those cannon, to convey them to a sea-port in Spain or Portugal, and to cause them to reach him 400 miles by land? To have supplied him with cannon in time to have been of any service to him, they must have possessed the means of sending him the cannon in a letter; they must have been conjurors, and, whatever they may be else, Lord Wellington knew too much of them to suppose them to be that.—It seems to me, though, certainly, I profess not to be a General, that, before I undertook a siege, I should have made an estimate of my means for carrying that siege through; in that estimate, I might have erred, and might have undertaken the siege with inadequate means, which appears to have been the case, in this instance; for, it is impossible to believe, that any man of common sense could have undertaken a siege in the heart of Spain, could have undertaken the siege of a fortress there, in the expectation of being supplied with a battering train from the banks of the Thames, and that, too, while he knew that the army of the enemy was equal in force to his own. The supposition is so absurd that it never could have been engendered in the brain of any man not stultified by party rancour.—Fair, as I flatter myself, is this view of the matter; obvious as, it appears to me, is the fact, that no blame whatever can attach to the ministers for the recent reverses in Spain, one of the assailants goes so far as to throw out a hint of the possibility, that Lord Wellington may re-

sign in disgust and leave the army to find its way back to Portugal as it can, in consequence of this alleged neglect on the part of the Government at home. But, the whole paragraph (in the Times news-paper of the 23d instant), is so curious and so ominously important, that I shall quote it at length before I proceed farther with my observations.—The writer says, “It is the business of a General to gain victories, —it is the business of a Minister to turn those victories to good account, and to make one ‘the fruitful mother of a hundred more.’ Our General has, over and over again, discharged his duty. How grating must it be to him to have discharged it *without benefit to his country or her cause*, and to find his most glorious victories followed by the necessity of retreat! It would be matter of curious speculation to see how Ministers would act, if his great mind would allow him to give way to this distressing sentiment; if he were to resign in disgust and leave the army to find its way back to Portugal as it could. Are they prepared for such an event? Have they a plan of their own for closing the campaign with success?—and have they a General of their own, another Lord Chatham, ready for its execution? Our army is, indeed, *critically situated. Reduced as it has been by sickness and service*, we understand that the united force of Lord Wellington and Sir Rowland Hill, at present (we hope) united on the Douro, is barely 36,000 British and 20,000 Portuguese. Soult with 60,000 is at Madrid. Should he form a combined plan of operations with Souham, he might bring a force of nearly 100,000 men to bear upon the British army. In such an event Lord Wellington must of necessity fall back. He could not even stop at Salamanca; he must retire behind Ciudad Rodrigo. One step preparatory to such a course of action has been taken, as matter of laudable precaution: the sick and wounded were moved on the 25th ult. from Madrid to Salamanca. This circumstance gave the real patriots of Madrid much concern, as well it might. It was but too indicative of a change about to overcloud all the bright prospects of loyal hope. We, however, trust that the deficiencies of the Cabinet will still be (as they have been hitherto) counterbalanced by energy in the field. We rely on the talents of the Marquis of



“Wellington, to frustrate all the skill of
 “all the French Commanders united; but
 “we cannot help reflecting, that our be-
 “loved Hero is mortal; a chance shot,—
 “a fever, might blast all our hopes; and
 “the prospect of dragging on the war in
 “Spain, *like a Walcheren expedition,*
 “would be enough to reduce the most zealous friend of his country to despair.”

—This paragraph sets out with a position, from which, though laid down in so dogmatical a manner, I must beg leave explicitly to dissent. In one way, indeed, it is the business of a minister to turn victory to account. It is his business, and I said at the time, that it was the business of our minister, to turn the victory of Salamanca to account, by offering Napoleon, who was alleged to be the defeated party, *terms of peace*; but, in a *military* point of view, it is not only the business of a general, and especially of a *commander in chief*, to turn his own victories to account; but, it is his business to avoid fighting, and, of course, to avoid gaining victories, unless he be convinced that he can turn them to account; for, unless victory be attended with *beneficial results*, every life lost in the acquiring of it is a *life thrown away*. Strictly speaking, it is *not a victory*, with which word we always associate the idea of advantage as to the *main object contended for*. If, for example, a commander be successful, as MELAS was at the battle of Marengo, in the former part of the day, and if he be defeated in the latter part of the day, no man thinks of saying that he has gained a victory. And, if he be successful in his attempt at advancing to-day, and be compelled to abandon his ground to-morrow, can he with reason be said to have been victorious? It is in the results of battles that we are to look for the proof of victory; and, if it belong to ministers to be the cause of the results, the merit of all victories must remain with them.—This writer says, that it must be *grating* to Lord Wellington to find his most glorious victories followed by the necessity of retreat. Doubtless, it may have been grating to him; but then, who has he to blame for it? The Spaniards, perhaps; those who ought, or whom he expected to second his efforts; but, certainly, not those by whom those efforts were not commanded to be made. He was commander-in-chief; he was upon the spot; he, if any one could, must have known the extent of his own means and of those of the enemy; and if he was unable to perceive

that his most glorious victories would be followed by the necessity of retreat, how were the ministers in England to be able to foresee, much less to prevent, such necessity?—This writer, who, a few weeks ago, ascribed to Lord Wellington exclusively the merit of having nearly annihilated the French army, has now the cool impudence to tell his readers that the British army is, in numerical strength, not much more than a third part of that of the French army; and that, if the latter should bear down upon him, he must be compelled to retire into Portugal. Well, and what of that? Could the ministers in England prevent the French army from being so strong, or did they give imperative orders for undertaking those marches, those battles, and those sieges, by which the English army must have been so materially reduced? Let any candid man put this question to himself, and I am persuaded the answer will be the contrary of that which is suggested by this writer.—We are here told, that our sick and wounded being removed from Madrid to Salamanca gave our friends at the former place much concern; that it was indicative of a change about to over-cloud all their bright prospects. There is no question of the truth of this; but, how could this change be ascribed to the *deficiencies of our cabinet*, who were not upon the spot, who could know very little of what was going on, who had exercised no control over the movements of our commander, and in whose power it was not to prevent any of the causes which compelled him to retreat? If our army be, as this writer asserts it is, reduced by sickness and service, to whom is the cause of that effect to be ascribed? If it be *critically situated*, that situation may have been caused by the *zeal*, by the *bravery*, by any other estimable quality in the commander; but, surely, common sense, as well as common justice, forbid us to ascribe it to the ministers in England, who have had no more to do in all probability, in causing those movements which have placed the army in such a critical situation, than they had in gaining the victory of Salamanca.—It may suit the hireling who writes in the Times newspaper, and it may suit the proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, who condescends to make his columns subservient to the purposes of an insolent and greedy faction of oligarchs; these, it may suit to give to Lord Wellington all the merit of every advantage that he obtains over the enemy with the immense means placed in his hands; and to give to the

ministers all the demerit of every reverse that he sustains. But, men in general do not, and will not, decide in this way. They will say, that, if to him belongs exclusively the glory of victory, to him also belongs exclusively, whatever attribute attaches to retreat; and I am sure, that, if the whole nation were put to the vote upon the subject, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand would say with me, that this writer, in supposing it possible, that Lord Wellington, now that he sees his army *critically situated*, should resign in disgust, and leave it to find its way back to Portugal as it could, has imputed to him the possible possession of a mind, the seat of baseness itself. What! A commander in chief, who has advanced into a country of his own accord; who has been absolute master of his operations; who has had ascribed to him exclusively all the advantages he has gained; who has been covered with honours and rewards, in which even his posterity is to partake; shall such a man, when, before the close of the campaign, he finds himself beset with difficulties, resign in disgust! Shall he abandon his post, and, with it that army by the valour of whom he has gained a profusion of titles and of pecuniary compensation! The very idea must fill every man of honour, every man who has the ordinary sentiments of morality, with indignation and abhorrence. If ever there was a commander who had no reason to complain of being thwarted in his plans and operations, Lord Wellington appears to me to be in that state. He has had, and has, every thing within his reach, under his absolute control. He is commander in chief of the English forces; he has long been generalissimo of the Portuguese army, and he is now generalissimo of the Spanish army. His brother is our ambassador to the Spanish government; the political parties at home have vied with each other in their praises of him and his deeds. No fault has ever been found of any thing that he has done: advancing or retreating behind his lines and in the open field, capturing fortresses or raising sieges; still has he been praised; with him the tide of titles and rewards has never ceased to flow. It is, therefore, most abominably unjust towards the government to pretend, that they are answerable for every reverse that may happen to him. I, for my part, should rather be inclined to say, that if the war should finally prove disastrous, the fault was his, or at least, as much his as theirs. I do not mean in a

military point of view; for of that any one in my situation can be but a poor judge; but, I should, in case of final failure, blame him, who must have such excellent means of obtaining information, for not discovering in time, that the *cause* was a cause not to be maintained. I do not pretend to the gift of prophecy; and I do not know how the contest may end; but, if we should be finally compelled to yield up the Peninsula to the French, I am not one of those who shall be disposed to lay all the blame upon the ministers, who cannot be so well informed as to many important points as those who have been upon the spot, and who have had such ample means of observation as well as of information. Of this way of thinking, however, is not our good hireling of the Times newspaper. He, on the contrary, would lay the sins even of the Spanish government, as it is called, upon our ministers, that is to say, upon the present set, without Lord Wellesley amongst them, whom he denominates the "*first Statesman in Europe*." He says, the "Government of Spain is new. It needs the guidance of experience. It requires to be protected and to be directed. Protection has been afforded to it by the blood and treasure of the British nation; to give it direction and advice is the proper task of the British Ministry. Three years ago it was stated, that there was no absolute want of resources in the country, no inherent or incorrigible defects in the materials of which the body of the Army was composed, and no perverse or untractable disposition in the mass of the people of Spain, yet at that time no system had been established by which the deficiencies of one district could be supplied from the abundance of another, or by which the resources of any one province could be made properly available for its own or the general defence; there were corruption and treachery among many of the Civil Authorities,—the numbers, composition, and discipline of the army were defective,—and many of its chief officers were notoriously incapable, or disaffected. If these defects were now wholly removed, it is utterly incredible, that Spain should not have shaken off her invaders "like dew-drops from the lion's mane;" but if the defects exist, we say they argue not merely an *imbecility* in Spain, but *here in England*,—here, at the head-quarters of the cause. *Our Ministers are to blame*, if they do not exercise the weight they possess in

“ Spain, to improve her internal system,
 “ —they are infinitely *more to blame*, if
 “ *they possess no weight in that country.*
 “ We have heretofore censured them for
 “ *not sending a larger British army into*
 “ *the field*; we now charge it on them as
 “ a fault, that they have *not sent*, or
 “ *caused to be sent into the field, a larger,*
 “ *better equipped, and better disciplined*
 “ *Spanish army.* If they should say, they
 “ are unable to effect this, we must own
 “ that we should partly believe them; but
 “ we are convinced, that *there are others*
 “ *who would be able to effect it*; we are
 “ convinced, that until it is effected, the
 “ heavy burden of taxation in this coun-
 “ try will be borne the more impatiently,
 “ because it will appear to *the multitude* to
 “ be borne in vain.”—At the close of this
 paragraph one cannot help smiling. *There*
are others who would be able to effect the
 desirable object of drawing forth the peo-
 ple of Spain to assist us in driving out the
 French. That is to say, if the ministers
 would but make room for the patrons of
 this writer, we should see all the people in
 Spain armed against the French, and fight-
 ing like Christian heroes, under the ban-
 ners of St. Dominick, to drive the French
 across the Pyrennees. Alas! The people of
 Spain neither know nor care who are minis-
 ters in England, any more than they know
 or care about what is passing in the moon.
 They have no interest in the question of
 who is to enjoy the sinecure places, and who
 is to have the giving away of commissions,
 leases, grants, and the like, in England.
 They have their eye stedfastly fixed upon
 one thing, and that is, who is doing in their
 country that which is best for them, and
 they are very likely to regard him as their
 friend who shall seem disposed to suffer
 them to have the greatest share of victuals
 and drink. Spain is in a state of revolu-
 tion. There are two armies, two foreign
 armies, fighting in the country, and, like
 all other people in a similar situation, the
 Spaniards are rather spectators than actors
 in the scene. The deception so fatal to us,
 has been, that we have continually been
 told that the Spaniards were *unanimously*
on our side. If this had been true, the
 French must long ago have been driven
 from the country. When we shall be con-
 vinced of our error I know not. Very
 likely the delusion may last for a year or
 two longer, though I do not think that that
 is very probable. At any rate this notion,
 that a change of ministry in England would
 effect a change of disposition in the people

of Spain is perfectly ridiculous, and especi-
 ally as the writer, whose words we have
 quoted, obviously aims at the introduction
 into power of Lord Wellesley and Mr. Can-
 ning, one or the other of whom has always
 been in place until February, ever since
 the war in the Peninsula began. If they
 could do nothing to rouse the people of
 Spain, when they were in power before,
 why should they be able to effect that ob-
 ject if they were in power again! It would
 be difficult, I believe, for the hiring of
 the Times to answer this question; yet, un-
 til he can answer it, he may be assured that
 it is full as well for him to hold his tongue.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 26th Nov. 1812.

WAR IN SPAIN.

Downing-Street, Nov. 17.—*Dispatches,*
of which the following are extracts, have
been this day received at Earl Bathurst's
Office, addressed to his Lordship by Ge-
neral the Marquis of Wellington, dated
Cabegon, 26th and 28th October, Rueda,
31st October, and 3d November, 1812.

Cabegon, 26th October, 1812.

I have been so much occupied by the
 movements and operations of the army
 since the 18th inst. that I have not been
 able to write to your Lordship.—The
 operations of the Castle of Burgos conti-
 nued nearly in the state in which they were
 when I addressed your Lordship on the
 11th instant, till the 18th. Having at
 that time received a supply of musket am-
 munition from Santander, and having,
 while waiting for that necessary article,
 completed a mine under the church of St.
 Roman, which stood in an outwork of the
 second line, I determined that the breach
 which we had effected in the second line
 should be stormed on that evening, at the
 moment this mine should explode; and
 that at the same time the line should be
 attacked by escalade.—The mine suc-
 ceeded, and Lieutenant Colonel Browne
 lodged a party of the 9th Cacadores, and
 a detachment of Spanish troops of the regi-
 ment of Asturias in the out-work. A de-
 tachment of the King's German Legion,
 under Major Wurmb, carried the breach,
 and a detachment of the Guards succeeded
 in escalading the line; but the enemy
 brought such a fire upon these two last de-
 tachments, from the third line, and the
 body of the castle itself, and they were at-

tacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support, allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.—It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing that if I could breach the wall of the Castle we should carry the place.—Another mine was commenced under the second line from the church of St. Roman, of which we remained in possession.—The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca to reconnoitre our out-posts at Monasterio. They attacked the picquet at the bridge in front of that town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the Infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair, Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable Frederick Ponsouby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely, and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.—I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post at Monasterio on the evening of the 18th. The subaltern of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a picquet in St. Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy, and he was taken with his picquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which commanded the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire on the morning of the 19th to the Burgos side of the town.—I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavouring to raise it, and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Rio Vena and Magaradas, and the left at Soto Pallacio. The enemy's

army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio. They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with about ten thousand men to drive in our outpost at Quintana Palla, and Olmos. The former withdrew by order, but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested Lieutenant General Sir Edward Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank, which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio, and our posts were replaced in Quintana Palla.—On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir Rowland Hill, of the 17th, in which he acquainted me of the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.—The Castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th instant.—The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than seventy thousand men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom.—I had desired Lieutenant General Sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated, in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making; I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 20th, and moved the whole army back towards the Douro.—I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make. Your Lordship is aware that I was never very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack made on the first line on the 22d or the 29th had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were limited; but it appeared to me, that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain.—I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops dur-

ing the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of Guards.—During the latter part of the siege the weather was very unfavourable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the artillery and engineer departments—Lieutenant Colonel Robe, and Lieutenant Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance; and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting three eighteen pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ultimo in the storm of the hornwork. Having sent our cattle to meet the equipment expected from Santander, we had not the means of moving the latter.—The enemy was not aware of our movement, and did not follow us till late on the 22d, when ten thousand men encamped on this side of Burgos.—The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepan and Baniel. We continued our march on the following day, the right of the army to Torquemada, the left of Cordevilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.—The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear-guard consisted of two light battalions of the King's German Legion, under Colonel Halkett, and of Major General Anson's brigade of cavalry: and Major General Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo to give them support. The whole under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of Guerillas, heretofore commanded by the late Martinez, on the hills on the left of our rear-guard.—Major General Anson's brigade charged twice with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy was detained above three hours by the troops under Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.—The rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the Guerillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear-guard of Major General Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss, and Lieutenant Colonel Pelly,

of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.—The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Major General Bock's and Major General Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was hardly pressed. The enemy made their charges on the two light battalions of the King's German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct and that of Colonel Halkett who commanded them.—The exertions and conduct of Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, and of the officers and staff attached to him throughout this day, were highly meritorious, and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves.—The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Duenas, and its left at Villa Muriel, and the 1st battalion 1st Guards joined us from Corunna.—I halted here on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major General Oswald, in the absence of Lieutenant Leith on account of indisposition.—I had directed the third battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place, but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed Major General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the fifth division. The bridge of Villa Muriel was destroyed; but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of infantry and cavalry. I made Major General Pringle and Major General Barnes attack these troops under the orders of Major General Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire

upon the left had been very severe throughout the day; from which we suffered a great deal; and Major General Don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded whilst urging on the Spanish infantry in pursuit of the enemy.—I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabeçon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga.—The enemy appear to be moving in this direction from Duenas. I propose to halt here to-morrow.—P. S. I have the honour to enclose returns of the killed and wounded.

Return of killed and wounded of the Army under the Command of His Excellency General the Marquis of Wellington, K. B. in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 11th to the 17th of October, 1812.

Royal British Artillery. 5 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded.—Royal Military Artificers. 1 rank and file wounded.—Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt. 3 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—3d Foot Guards, 1st Batt. 3 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.—1st Foot, 3d Batt. 1 lieutenant wounded.—2d Foot, or Queen's. 10 rank and file wounded.—32d Foot, 1st Batt. 1 rank and file killed; 1 ensign, 2 serjeants, 1 rank and file wounded.—36th Foot, 1st Batt. 1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.—42 Foot, 1st Batt. 3 rank and file wounded.—63d Foot, 2d Batt. 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file wounded.—58th Foot, 2d Batt. 1 rank and file killed; 1 ensign wounded.—60th Foot, 5th Batt. 2 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—61st Foot, 1st Batt. 1 rank and file wounded.—79th Foot, 1st Batt. 1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion. 2 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.—2d Ditto, Ditto. 3 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.—5th Ditto, Ditto. 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.

Total British loss. 1 serjeant, 23 rank and file, killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 3 serjeants, 39 rank and file wounded.—Total Portuguese loss. 4 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 27 rank and file wounded.—General Total. 1 serjeant, 27 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 3 serjeants, 66 rank and file wounded.

(Signed) S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. G.

Names of Officers Wounded.

11th October, 1812.

32 Foot. Ensign Quill, severely.

16th October, 1812.

1st Foot.—Lieutenant Rae, Acting Engineer, slightly.—58th Foot. Ensign Baylie, slightly.

Portuguese.—15th October, 1812.

12th Regiment of the Line. Captain White, severely.

(Signed) S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. G.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of his Excellency General the Marquis of Wellington, K. B. in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 18th to the 21st October, 1812, inclusive.

Royal Engineers. 1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—Royal British Artillery.

1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.—Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt. 1 captain, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 22 rank and file, killed; 2 captains, 1 serjeant, 32 rank and file, wounded.—3d Foot Guards, 1st Batt. 8 rank and file killed; 2 lieutenants, 15 rank and file, wounded.—11th Foot, 1st Batt. 1 rank and file killed; 1 serjeant, 4 rank and file, wounded.—24th Foot, 2d Batt. 4 rank and file killed; 3 rank and file wounded.—42d Foot, 1st Batt. 8 rank and file wounded.—53d Foot, 2d Batt. 1 rank and file wounded.—58th Foot, 2d Batt. 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, killed; 12 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—60th Foot, 5th Batt. 2 rank and file wounded.—61st Foot, 1st Batt. 2 rank and file wounded.—79th Foot, 1st Batt. 1 rank and file wounded.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion. 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 24 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 22 rank and file, wounded.—2d Ditto, Ditto. 1 major, 2 rank and file, killed; 2 lieutenants, 7 rank and file, wounded.—5th Ditto, Ditto. 12 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 7 rank and file, wounded.

Total British loss. 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 81 rank and file, killed; 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 119 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—Total Portuguese loss. 8 rank and file killed; 1 ensign, 2 serjeants, 41 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—General Total. 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 89 rank and file, killed; 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 serjeants, 160 rank and file, wounded; 4 rank and file missing.

(Signed) S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. G.

Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded.

KILLED—18th October.

Coldstream Guards. Captain Harvey.

19th October.

Coldstream Guards. Ensign Burgess.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion. Lieutenant Bothmer.—2d Ditto, Ditto. Major Wurmb.

WOUNDED—18th October.

3d Foot Guards. Lieutenants Holborn and Knox, severely.—Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt. Captain the Honourable W. G. Crofton, slightly; Captain the Honourable J. Walpole, severely.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion. Captain Laroche, dangerously.—2d Ditto, Ditto. Lieutenants Hesse and Quade, severely.—5th Ditto, Ditto. Captain Backmeister, severely, right arm amputated; Lieutenant Schlaegar, slightly.

(Signed) S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. G.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Marquis of Wellington, dated Cabeçon, October 28, 1812.

Since I wrote to your Lordship upon the 26th, I have had an opportunity of seeing the enemy's whole army, as they placed themselves opposite to us, on the Pisuerga, yesterday. They are certainly in very great strength. The army of Portugal has received a reinforcement of ten thousand men, including cavalry, from France: and I have reason to believe that there are two divisions of infantry now with this army,

belonging to the army of the north. The cavalry of the army of the north is certainly with the army of Portugal, and they have at least five thousand good cavalry.—No event of importance has occurred since I addressed your Lordship on the 26th. The enemy formed their army in the plain in our front yesterday. They have cannonaded different parts of our line without doing us any injury, excepting that Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, of the Royal Artillery, was wounded severely, but not dangerously, yesterday.

Rueda, October 31, 1812.

The enemy crossed the Carrion on the 26th and 27th, and formed their army on the heights near Cijales, on the last of those days, opposite our position on the left of the Pisuerga, and their advanced guard about two miles in front of their main body, and half that distance from Cabeçon.—On the 28th they extended their right, and endeavoured to force the bridges of Simancas and Valladolid, the former of which was defended by Colonel Halkett, with his brigade of the 7th division, and the latter by Lieutenant General the Earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the 7th division. At length Colonel Halket, being hard pressed, blew up the bridge. He at the same time detached the Brunswick Oels' regiment to Tordesillas, towards which quarter the enemy detached troops on the evening of the 28th. As soon as I found that this was the case, I thought it proper to break up from the Pisuerga and to cross the Douro, which object was effected without difficulty on the 29th instant, by the bridges of Puente Douro and Tudela.—The bridge of Tordesillas was destroyed on the enemy's approach to that town, on the evening of the 28th, and I had sent orders to the regiment of Brunswick Oels to take post on its ruins, in such manner as to prevent the enemy from repairing the bridge. I had the mortification, however, of learning, on the night of the 29th, that this regiment had been obliged to abandon its post, and as I had seen the enemy's whole army in march towards Tordesillas on that evening, it was obvious that no time was to be lost. I therefore marched the army at an early hour yesterday morning to their left, and posted the troops on the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite, and near the bridge of Tordesillas. We found the bridge nearly repaired on our arrival, but the enemy had made no attempt to pass it, and they have

now no large assembly of troops in this neighbourhood.—I learn that some of them marched last night towards Valladolid, and others towards Toro.—I have received letters from Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill of the 29th.—The Tagus was every where fordable, and the enemy had passed a small body of troops over at Fuente Duenas.—Sir Rowland Hill had collected his troops on the Jacamah. He was likely to receive my orders to move upon Anvalo on the 29th.

Rueda, Nov. 3, 1812.

I take the opportunity of the return of the messenger Myers to Corunna, to inform you that the army have continued in the position in which I placed them on the 30th of October; and the enemy have made no attempt to pass the Douro. The bridge of Tordesillas is repaired, and they are employed in the repair of that of Toro. Their troops are extended along the Douro, from the latter place to Valladolid.—In the mean time, the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill will arrive this day and to-morrow on the Adaja. The General received my orders to break up from his position on the Jacama on the 29th, and he intended to carry them into execution on the morning of the 30th. He had intended to destroy the Puente Larga, but the mine failed; and the enemy having collected a large body of troops between the bridge and Aranjuez, they immediately attacked our post on the bridge, but were repulsed with considerable loss by the second battalion of the 47th regiment, and a detachment of the 95th, under the command of Colonel Skerret. I have not received the return of our loss upon this occasion, but I understand it is about forty men. No officer was touched. Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill mentions in high terms the conduct of the troops. These circumstances delayed the march from the right of Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill's positions till the evening of the 30th, and he has since continued it without being at all molested by the enemy.—The building called La China, in the Retiro, and all the guns, stores, &c., which that work contained, which had not been carried away, were destroyed before the troops were withdrawn from Madrid.—The Spanish divisions of Don Carlos d'España and Conde de Penne Villemur are with Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill. A small body of the enemy's troops were at Valde Moro on the 31st, and entered

Madrid at ten o'clock on the morning of the 1st instant.—I have accounts from the North, stating that Longa has taken a convoy escorted by three hundred men, near Victoria.

To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.

Sir,

It is by no means my intention to enter into the controversy on the general state of our Currency, which has been feebly renewed by some of your correspondents, in consequence of Mr. Monck's having published the letter I addressed to all the Gentlemen concerned in issuing Local Tokens, whose directions I could procure.—After all that has passed, I really cannot now descend to argue with those who have still the folly to conceive that the Paper Currency of this country is not depreciated.—Neither do I think it necessary to assign further reasons for maintaining, that our lawful currency may be restored even in time of war, and that this measure would be attended with almost immediate beneficial effects on the state of the exchange. These are propositions on which I believe no man can seriously entertain a doubt, who knows what took place during war in the year 1696. For it is impossible to suppose that even the Chancellor of the Exchequer must not renounce all reliance upon his misquotations from Davenant, and acknowledge that at that time the exchange became favourable long before the restoration of peace, when he reads the following extract from the Proclamation printed in the Gazette of the 28th of September, 1696:

"The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury having likewise moved their Excellencies (at the desire of several Merchants who have considerable quantities of Gold Bullion, which they cannot export, by reason of the present course of exchange, without great loss), that liberty might be given to coin the said gold, they offering to do it at their own charge. Their Excellencies are pleased to approve thereof, and to order that the said Lords Commissioners do direct the Officers of the Mint to receive and coin any Gold Bullion that is brought to the Mint after the first day of October next, the Proprietors paying the charge of coinage. And their Excellencies were also pleased to direct that this order should be published in the Gazette."

(Signed) RICH. COLINGE.

Without at all going into the discussion in which your Correspondents have been recently engaged, I must observe, that neither they nor any of the numerous advocates for the measures Government has pursued in relation to our currency, have hitherto attempted to explain the benefits to be derived from the Legislature's interposing to raise the current value of the bank-note to twenty shillings, when its real value is so much degraded. But, indeed, had the effort been made, it would have been fruitless. No country can derive benefit from such a project; for, to use the language of the Parliament of Scotland centuries ago, the "pennyworths must always 'rise with the penny.'"

The system which the Legislature has adopted most certainly deprives the stockholder of a portion of what the Government had contracted to pay to him; it enriches the tenant at the expense of the landlord; and gives to the debtor an opportunity of defrauding his creditors. But this is not more repugnant to justice and policy than it is to the ancient practice of our Legislature. For when in the time of James III. of Scotland the denominative value of the money was raised, it was immediately by law provided, that debtors who owe any debts or contracts made before, should pay to their creditors the same sums in *substance* as it was intended betwixt them before the measure took place, and that all contracts in future should be paid according to the agreements betwixt the parties.†

The subject of our Paper Money is in itself complicated; and whilst many have an interest in deceiving, a still greater number have an interest in being deceived, it is not, therefore, surprising, that the present departure from what seems to have been the ancient wise policy of our Legislature, should meet with applause.

But the question concerning the propriety of prohibiting the circulation of those Local Tokens, to which this paper system has given rise, is in itself more simple. And the object of my now addressing you is, to return my thanks to the numerous Issuers of Tokens who have honoured me with replies to the queries I thought it my duty to circulate, for they have put me in possession of a case, which makes it so clear,

* See Preamble to Ch. 24th of the 4th James III.

† See Ch. 19th, 3d of James III.—See also Ch. 69th, 8th of James III.

that every description of the community are deeply interested in the repeal of the Act of last Session of Parliament, that it is impossible to suppose any delusion can prevail on this branch of the subject.

From the information I have thus obtained, I can now with confidence assert,—

1st. That if this Act is not repealed, more than six times the value in Tokens that His Majesty has coined of silver money during his reign, must in March next be withdrawn from circulation.

2dly. That the real value of those Tokens is greater in proportion to their nominal value than that of the shillings and sixpences which are now current; and that of course the coin that is to be withdrawn affords a better security to the holder than the coin that it is intended should circulate.

3dly. That the Bank's Tokens can afford comparatively no resource—few of them remain in any part of the country where they have been issued; and what is called the rise in the value of silver, must soon banish the whole from circulation. Besides, it was from the first impossible to obtain from the Bank the necessary quantity, and recently so many counterfeits have appeared, that people at a distance have been unwilling to accept them.

4thly. That notwithstanding the quantity of Local Tokens in circulation, there is such a deficiency of silver money, that 5, and even 10 per cent. is given to get silver for a note; and that in many places change cannot be obtained without five or ten shillings of copper money is accepted. Nay, such is the difficulty of getting small money, even with the aid of Local Tokens, that there are instances of Tax-gatherers, who have illegally circulated silver notes to facilitate the collection of the revenue.

5thly. That before the Local Tokens began to be circulated, paper notes, though in violation of the law, were becoming common, and that master manufacturers in many instances commenced the practice of paying their workmen with paper tickets, and establishing a shop in the neighbourhood, to give commodities in exchange for them. A practice still unfortunately prevalent, which has the mischievous consequences of subjecting the poor workmen to pay a monopoly price for every article they consume.

6thly. That if measures are not adopted to enable us to revert to the use of the ancient lawful currency of these realms, and if the law continues to prohibit silver notes, as well as to inflict penalties on the circula-

tion of Local Tokens, there can, after the month of March next, be no adequate means of making small payments, which must involve the country in difficulties hitherto unexperienced.

With the knowledge of these facts, it would be natural to conclude, that the law must be altered, and that the Act of last Session must be repealed. For it cannot be supposed that there exists a man, who, after having foolishly carried away the masts of his vessel, would persevere in prohibiting the crew from erecting jurmasts, and allow the ship to remain an unmanageable hulk on the water. Yet his folly would be trifling in comparison of that of a Government, who having rendered the circulation of lawful coin impossible, should prohibit the subject from resorting to any other means of conducting the necessary exchanges of commodities.

Indeed, under any other circumstances than those in which we are placed, I should think the inference that the law must be altered, certain. But when I recollect that the American War, under which our commerce is now suffering, is to be ascribed to the obstinate perseverance of Ministers in the Orders of Council—and that their too tardy conviction of the mischiefs attending that unfortunate measure, was at last only extorted by the overwhelming multiplicity of the witnesses who appeared before Parliament, I feel it a further duty thus openly to solicit additional information from those who are anxious to avert the evil with which the law threatens us, and who have as yet delayed honouring me with a reply.

LAUDERDALE.

Dunbar-house,
Dunbar, Nov. 3, 1812.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Report of the Military Commission sitting at Paris.—(Continued from page 670.)

above-named, in conformity with the Articles 87 and 88 of the Penal Code of 1810.

—The Military Commission discharged and acquitted, 1st, unanimously, the Sieurs Gomont, called St. Charles, Sub-lieutenant; Joachim Alexandre Lebis and Amable Aime, Provost Lieutenants; Jean Charles Francois Godard, Captain; Joseph Antoine Viallevielhe, Jean-Henri Caron, Pierre Charles Limozin, Adjutants, sub-officers; Jean Joseph Julien and Jean Baptista Caumitte, Sergeants-major, of the

crime of being accomplices, of which they were accused: 2d, by a majority of four to three, the *Sieur George Rouff*, Captain, of the crime of being an accomplice, of which he was accused, conformably to the law of the 13th Brumaire, year 5.—The Military Commission ordered that the acquitted above-named should be placed at the disposal of His Excellency the Minister of War.—Enjoined the Judge Reporter to read the present judgment to the condemned and the acquitted, and to cause it to be executed in all its extent within 24 hours.—Done at the public and permanent Sitting at Paris, the 29th of the said month of October, as above.

(Signed) The Members of the Commission.

This judgment was yesterday affixed in Paris. At three in the afternoon twelve of the condemned suffered their sentence at the *Plaine de Grenelle*. *Rabbe* and *Rateau* have received a respite.

Paris, Oct. 31.—The mad attempt made by a few brigands to disturb the public tranquillity, and to substitute the horrors of anarchy to legitimate authority, has justly excited the indignation of all good citizens. The unshaken fidelity to their Sovereign, of which every class of people has given an honourable proof on this occasion, may suffice to convince the traitors, if it were possible that any yet existed, that a Government founded on wise laws, on the love and on the interests of the citizens, rests on an unshaken basis.—A long and fatal experience has opened our eyes too well to allow us to become the dupes of a few wretches, who, shaken off by society on account of their criminal conduct, and having nothing to lose, are bent only on disorder, and regret those disastrous times when virtue, talents, and opulence, were titles of proscription; when the most sacred laws of humanity were violated with impunity, and when violence and corruption degraded even the depositories of authority. Where is the proprietor, where is the father of a family who does not return thanks to heaven for having placed on the Imperial Throne the August Monarch whose tutelary power secures to every Frenchman his rights and his property, who animates with his genius every part of the Government, recompenses zeal, represses injustice, and punishes public and individual crimes?—If every individual, of whatever class or profession,

wishes to exert his industry with security, to profess the religion of his fathers with freedom, and to enjoy in peace his inheritance, or the property which he owes to his labour; if he no longer fears lest Brigands should deprive him of the means of maintaining his family, and reduce him to wretchedness, to whom does he owe so many precious advantages, but to the protecting Government, which every where maintains law and order? This truth is now felt by every Frenchman. These reflections burst from every heart, when, loaded with the public execration, the traitors and their adherents underwent the just punishment of their criminal attempts. Every man, withdrawing within himself, saw in each conspirator not only an enemy of the laws, but also a private enemy. The honourable sign with which several of them were invested still added to the indignation. Ingratitude added to treachery rendered it still more odious. We have never seen, under any circumstances, more harmony in the public opinion, and a greater unanimity of sentiment. We insist on this point, because it does honour to the character of the inhabitants of Paris, and proves that they know their true interests, which cannot be separated from respect for the laws, and love for the Sovereign.—While His Majesty the Emperor shares the fatigues of his brave legions, while every one of his movements is a triumph, and he is consolidating in the North the glory and happiness of France, and the repose of the Continent; while his warlike labours in the most healthy climate of Europe only contribute to fortify his health, this opportunity is taken to disseminate the report of his death, as if every Frenchman had not sworn fidelity to the Imperial dynasty; as if the Constitutions of the State had not secured the order of succession to the Throne.—Does not every one of us tell our children “we have been plunged in the misfortunes of a revolution, which dissolved all the ties which attach man to his country and his fellows. We durst not calculate the termination of the public calamity and of private misfortunes, when a hero, elevated by victory and his genius above other men, repaired all our evils, re-assembled the scattered wrecks of our social institutions, and united us under a paternal Government, immutably established and fixed by the national will. You will be more happy than we have been. He will leave you heirs of his grandeur and his genius. It is on this in-

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fant King, born for the happiness of Frenchmen, that our hopes and your future felicity are founded. He is the pledge of the national prosperity and your repose. The oaths which we have taken to his august father are also the heritage of his son. In passing from the one to the other they do not change their nature, and bind us equally to both of them. Let this truth be always present to the eyes of every Frenchman, and we need no longer fear the plots of the wicked, nor the convulsions which afflict the nations abandoned by the wrath of Heaven to anarchy."—

What gives a distinct character to the last attempt against public order, is, that from the first moment of its execution, the impossibility of success, and the atrocity of the crime, struck every mind, and even the accomplices themselves. Such also was the rapid march of authority, that in less than two hours every one of the criminals were seized and chained. Nothing can be a stronger proof of the wisdom of the institution destined to protect the citizens; nothing can contribute more to quiet them than this developement of force, which put a stop, even in the moment of execution, to crimes the most difficult to foresee.

—May the act of justice exercised against these traitors teach every man that the times of disorder are for ever past, and that no one can withdraw with impunity from the fidelity which he has sworn to his Sovereign and his august dynasty.—We learn from Vienna, that His Highness Field-Marshal the Prince of Schwartzenberg has again beaten General Tormazow, taken a great number of prisoners, and ten cannon.—The Empress visited yesterday the Napoleon Museum. Her Majesty returned at three o'clock to the Palace of Saint Cloud.—It was by orders of His Excellency the Grand Judge that the execution of the Military Commission, sitting at Paris, was suspended, with respect to Rabbe and Ratian, under condemnation.

Paris, Nov. 1.

Minister of War.—Army of Arragon.

Extract of a Letter addressed to His Excellency the Duke de Feltre, Minister of War, by the Marshal Duke d'Albufera.

Valencia, Oct. 17.—In the night between the 4th and 5th instant the English General Donkin, Quarter Master General of the Anglo-Spanish Army, disembarked near the heights of St. Nicholas, before Denia, with the 81st Regiment of the line, some

gunners and other troops, to the amount of from 1,000 to 1,200 men, and two pieces of cannon; two 74-gun ships, a brig of war, and several gun boats and small vessels protected the disembarkation without gun-shot to the fort. These troops formed behind a ravine, established a battery, and towards morning marched in columns upon Denia, driving in the advanced posts, who slowly retired, disputing the ground.—The Chief of the artillery battalion, Bonafoux, Superior Commandant of Denia, had from break of day discovered the enemy, and made with his garrison dispositions of defence, composed of the 117th Regiment.—The English General summoned it. The Commandant Bonafoux coolly replied, that he waited the effect of his threats. At the same time with his handful of brave men he resolved to march upon the enemy, profiting by the arrival of the Captain of the 117th voltigeurs, Faubert, who on the report of the fire ran with his company; he marched it on the left of enemy to turn it, and with the remainder attacked them in front.—This double movement made the enemy recede, who precipitately embarked their cannon, and approached the shore, ordering their boats to approach the land. We pursued them with so much vigour, that they left 4 killed and 18 wounded upon the heights of St. Nicolas, and ran in crowds into the water, in order to escape more quickly under the protection of the fire of their vessels, and of the grenadiers of the 81st, who formed upon the beach in order to arrest us; but the French precipitated themselves upon them with so much vigour that they overthrew them, and caused them a considerable loss before they could re-embark. The enemy had in all 30 killed and nearly 80 wounded. On our side we had one killed and 15 wounded. Informed of this attack of the English, I ordered the General of Division, Hubert, to march the necessary troops thither, who found nothing to combat, and in the mean while charged General Harispe, to annoy and reconnoitre the enemy to the walls of Alicant. This movement was executed on the 8th of October, by the light cavalry brigade, the artillery, Mesclop's brigade, Robert's division, and the Cuirassiers from Rovaldi and Monforte, near St. Vicente. In sight of the place and Anglo-Espanola Army, General Harispe executed several movements to draw the enemy from their position, in order to fight them. The soldiers

(To be continued.)

ENGLISH LIBERTY OF THE PRESS,

As illustrated in the Prosecution and Punishment of

WILLIAM COBBETT.

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In order that my countrymen and that the world may not be deceived, duped, and cheated upon this subject, I, WILLIAM COBBETT, of Botley, in Hampshire, put upon record the following facts; to wit: That, on the 24th June, 1809, the following article was published in a London news-paper, called the **COURIER**:—"The Mutiny amongst the **LO-CAL MILITIA**, which broke out at Ely, was "fortunately suppressed on Wednesday by the "arrival of four squadrons of the **GERMAN "LEGION CAVALRY** from Bury, under the "command of General Auckland. Five of the "ringleaders were tried by a Court-Martial, and "sentenced to receive 500 lashes each, part of which "punishment they received on Wednesday, and "a part was remitted. A stoppage for their knap-sacks was the ground of the complaint that excited this mutinous spirit, which occasioned "the men to surround their officers, and demand "what they deemed their arrears. The first "division of the German Legion halted yesterday "at Newmarket on their return to Bury."—That, on the 1st July, 1809, I published, in the Political Register, an article censuring, in the strongest terms, these proceedings; that, for so doing, the Attorney General prosecuted, as seditious libellers, and by Ex-Officio Information, me, and also my printer, my publisher, and one of the principal retailers of the Political Register; that I was brought to trial on the 15th June, 1810, and was, by a Special Jury, that is to say, by 12 men out of 48 appointed by the Master of the Crown Office, found guilty; that, on the 20th of the same month, I was compelled to give bail for my appearance to receive judgment; and that, as I came up from Botley (to which place I had returned to my family and my farm on the evening of the 15th), a Tipstaff went down from London in order to seize me, personally; that, on the 9th of July, 1810, I, together with my printer, publisher, and the news-man, were brought into the Court of King's Bench to receive judgment; that the three former were sentenced to be imprisoned for some months in the King's Bench prison; that I was sentenced to be imprisoned for two years in Newgate, the great receptacle for malefactors, and the front of which is the scene of numerous hangings in the course of every year; that the part of the prison in which I was sentenced to be confined is sometimes inhabited by felons, that felons were actually in it at the time I entered it; that one man was taken out of it to be transported in about 48 hours after I was put into the same yard with him; and that it is the place of confinement for men guilty of unnatural crimes, of whom there are four in it at this time; that, besides this imprisonment, I was sentenced to pay a thousand pounds **TO THE KING**, and to give security for my good behaviour for seven years, myself in the sum of 3,000 pounds, and

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two sureties in the sum of 1,000 pounds each; that the whole of this sentence has been executed upon me, that I have been imprisoned the two years, have paid the thousand pounds **TO THE KING**, and have given the bail, Timothy Brown and Peter Walker, Esqrs. being my sureties; that the Attorney General was Sir Vicary Gibbs, the Judge who sat at the trial Lord Ellenborough, the four Judges who sat at passing sentence Ellenborough, Grose, Le Blanc, and Bailey; and that the jurors were, Thomas Rhodes of Hampstead Road, John Davis of Southampton Place, James Ellis of Tottenham Court Road, John Richards of Bayswater, Thomas Marsham of Baker Street, Robert Heathcote of High Street Marylebone, John Maud of York Place Marylebone, George Bagster of Church Terrace Pancras, Thomas Taylor of Red Lion Square, David Deane of St. John Street, William Palmer of Upper Street Islington, Henry Favre of Pall Mall; that the Prime Ministers during the time were Spencer Perceval, until he was shot by John Bellingham, and after that Robert B. Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool; that the prosecution and sentence took place in the reign of King George the Third, and that, he having become insane during my imprisonment, the 1,000 pounds was paid to his son, the Prince Regent, in his behalf; that, during my imprisonment, I wrote and published 364 Essays and Letters upon political subjects; that, during the same time, I was visited by persons from 197 cities and towns, many of them as a sort of deputies from Societies or Clubs; that, at the expiration of my imprisonment, on the 9th of July, 1812, a great dinner was given in London for the purpose of receiving me, at which dinner upwards of 600 persons were present, and at which Sir Francis Burdett presided; that dinners and other parties were held on the same occasion in many other places in England; that, on my way home, I was received at Alton, the first town in Hampshire, with the ringing of the Church bells; that a respectable company met me and gave me a dinner at Winchester; that I was drawn from more than the distance of a mile into Botley by the people; that, upon my arrival in the village, I found all the people assembled to receive me; that I concluded the day by explaining to them the cause of my imprisonment, and by giving them clear notions respecting the flogging of the Local Militia-men at Ely, and respecting the employment of German Troops; and, finally, which is more than a compensation for my losses and all my sufferings, I am in perfect health and strength, and, though I must, for the sake of six children, feel the diminution that has been made in my property (thinking it right in me to decline the offer of a subscription), I have the consolation to see growing up three sons, upon whose hearts, I trust, all these facts will be engraven.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, July 23, 1812.

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